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MacDwyer: Rostker v. Goldberg

NOTES

ROSTKER V GOLDBERG: THE
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION
DOCTRINE IN MILITARY
AFFAIRS

It is only superficially problematic that a feminist should
support military registration for women, because inherent in the
call for equal rights is the acceptance of equal responsibilities.
Historically, women have been placed in a contradictory and untenable position, denied basic civil rights and "protected" from
equally basic civic obligations. l Feminism requires the rejection
of all such "protective" schemes.

To military duty is attached symbolic as well as practical
importance.- Male-only registration excludes women from what
1. Women are both put on a .pedestal and deemed not fully developed.

persons. They are idealized; their approval and admiration is sought;
and they are at the same time regarded as less competent than men
and less able to live fully developed, fully human lives-for that is
what men do.
Wasserstrom, Racism, Sexism, and Preferential Treatment: An Approach to the TopiclJ,
24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 581, 589·90 (1977).
"There can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of
sex discrimination. Traditionally, such discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of
'romantic paternalism which, in practical effect, put women, not on a pedestal, but in a
cage." Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973). For a thorough discuaaion of
the effects of protective legislation, particularly as to women and labor, see J. BABR,
CHAINS OF PROTECTION (1978).
2. "[EJquality for women is important for reasons beyond its practical conse·
quences; it has symbolic importance because participation in the military life of a nation
is a unique political responsibility." Goodman, Women, War, and Equality, 5 WOMEN'S
RIGHTS L. REP. 243, 246·47 (1979).
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many consider the most basic of civic obligations,S subtly stigmatizes women as to subsequent public service, political power
and prestige,· and inevitably perpetuates anachronistic, stereotypical male and female roles. II
The recent trend in the Supreme Court's equal protection
analysis, particularly in the area of sex discrimination, encouraged some observers' to expect a ruling in Rostker v.
Goldberg7 based on heightened scrutiny.· The Supreme Court,
however, evaded any careful equal protection examination and
focused instead on judicial deference to Congress in military
affairs.'
This Note examines the Court's refusal in Goldberg to apply
3. R08tker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 2662 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting); 126
CONGo REc. 86530 (daily ed. June 10, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Kassebaum).
4. Goodman, supra note 2, at 246-47.
6. Id. at 263. "Legislative classifications which distribute benefits and burdens on
the basis of gender carry the inherent risk of reinforcing sexual stereotypes about the
'proper place' of women and their need for special protection .... " Orr V. Orr, 440 U.S.
268, 283 (1979).
6. [S)hould Congress reinstitute a compulsory draft registration reo
quirement using BeX as a proxy for an individual's capacity to dis·
charge military duty, there can be no doubt that litigation would be
brought and that the legislation would almost certainly be invali.
dated as violative of the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment.
126 CONGo REC. S6548 (daily ed. June 10, 1981) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield). Cf. Note,
Women and the Draft: The Constitutionality of AU· Male Registration, 94 HARv. L.
REV. 406, 423-25 (1980). Written prior to the Goldberg decision, the Note concludes that
the Supreme Court ought to apply heightened scrutiny to Rostker V. Goldberg and ought
not to defer to Congress because of the decision's broad public impact.
7. Goldberg V. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1980) was the original suit filed
in 1971 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs
charged that the Military Selective Service Act (MSSA) violated Constitutional guaran·
tees of due process, freedom of expression and assembly, laws against BeX discrimination,
and aided in the furtherance of an unlawful war. 101 S. Ct. at 2650 n.2. The District
Court disulissed the suit; the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, except for the
discrimination claim, which was remanded. In 1974, the District Court declined to dis·
miss the claim, although plaintiffs were no longer subject to registration, because plain·
tiffs still had an affirmative obligation to register. The suit then lay dormant for five
years. Id. at 2650. In July 1980, the District Court found the MSSA violated the due
process clause of the fifth amendment and permanently enjoined the Government from
requiring registration under it. 509 F. Supp. at 605-06.
8. Craig V. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (heightened scrutiny established as appropri·
ate level of review for gender·based discrimination suits). See infra notes 32-38 and ac·
companying text.
9. 101 S. Ct. at 2651-55.
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heightened scrutinylO to a discriminatory statute. The Court
never satisfactorily answered the constitutional challenge:
Whether, under the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment's due process clause, women as a class may be excluded from military registration. l l Further, this Note argues
that the Court improperly and unnecessarily deferred to congressional findings in ruling that Congress acted within its authority by registering only men. ll
I. DEVELOPMENT OF EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS
IN SEX DISCRIMINATION CHALLENGES
Dissatisfied with equal protection analysis governed either
by the permissive rational relation test or the rigid strict scrutiny standard, and sensing the nation's increased concern over
sex discrimination," the Court first attacked gender-based discrimination in Reed v. Reed. 14 In Reed, the Court struck down
an Idaho probate code provision11 under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The provision mandated
that of two equally situated family members contending for administration of a will, the male would automatically be appointed. The Court held that although administrative convenience was a rational state interest, Idaho's classification did not
rationally further that goalie The Court emphasized the impor10. For a discussion of equal protection case law and development of analyses see L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNIITITUTlONAL LAw 1060-97 (1978).
11. 509 F. Supp. at 596-97. The Diltrict Court carefully articulated the Goldberg
issue: "It is not enough to show that [women'B) inclusion was needed; it would have to be
shown that their exclusion was needed. . • . To Bummarize, we need only decide if there
is a substantial relationship between the exclusion of women and the raising of effective
armed forces." rd.
12. 101 S. Ct. at 2660.
13. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), (b), (c) (1976) (prohibiting
any employer, labor union, or other organization subject to provisions of the Act from
discriminating against any individual on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. I 206(d) (1976) (prohibiting discrimination by
employers against employees on the basil of sex).
14. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
15. The Idsho Probate Code required that estate administration be granted in the
following order: "(I) The surviving husband or wife or some competent person whom he
or she may request to have appointed, (2) The children, (3) The father or mother . . . ."
IDAHO PROBATB CODE' 15-312 (1972).
16. 404 U.S. at 76. The Court recognized the state'B right to classify persons for
different treatment under the law. However, persons otherwise similarly situated could
not be treated differently for reasons totally unrelated to the purpose of a statute. rd. at
75·76.
To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over
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tance of equal treatment for persons similarly situated, thereby
underlining a crucial element of traditional equal protection
analysis. 17
Several fifth amendment challenges followed. Frontiero v.
Richardson challenged an Air Force policy which required
spouses of female members to prove their financial dependence
before receiving medical benefits and increased quarters al10wances. ls Relying on Reed, the Court held administrative convenience did not justify the different treatment of similarly situmembers of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of
hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment; and whatever may be said as to
the positive values of avoiding intrafamily controversy, the
choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely on
the basis of sex.
Id. at 76·77. Although Reed was a fourteenth amendment challenge, the analysis used by
the Court became the analysis used in fifth amendment challenges as well .. The Court
consistently has considered the fifth and fourteenth amendments' guarantees inter·
changeable in sex discrimination suits. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636
(1975); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1972). See also, Karst, The Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55
N.C.L. REv. 541, 555 (1977). For a discussion of these cases see infra notes 18·32 and
accompanying text.
17. J. NOWAk, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 520 (1978) ("Equal Pro·
tection is the guarantee that similar people will be dealt with in a similar manner and
that people of different circumstances will not be treated as if they were the same."). See
Tussman & TenBroeck, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIP. L. REV. 341 (1949)
(the classic study of constitutional equal protection).
18. 411 U.S. 677 (1972). 37 U.S.C. § 401 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
In this chapter, "dependent", with respect to 8 member of a
uniformed service, means-·
(1) his spouse;
However, a person is not a dependent of a female member un·
less he is in fact dependent on her for over one· half of hie
support.
10 U.S.C. § 1072 (2) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
"Dependent", with respect to a member ... of a uniformed
service, means(A) the wife;
(C) the husband, if he is in fact dependent on the ... wife for
over one·half of his support.
Benefits would· be granted automatically to male service members regardless of the
spouse's dependence. Appellants claimed that their rights were violated both procedurally and substantively and sought a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the
statutes. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678·79 (1972).
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ated males and females 19 and that the statutes violated the due
process clause of the fifth amendment. so
In Schlesinger v. Ballardl l the Court took a turn by relying
on the similarly situated principle when it found constitutional
Navy statutes which allowed female officers longer tenure than
males before facing discharge for failure to be promoted. The
suit was brought by male naval officers, who argued they were
unfairly burdened because they were discharged if they were
passed over twice for promotion to lieutenant commander.1I Distinguishing Reed and Frontiero, the Court found the unequal
treatment of men and women was the result of women's reduced
19. 411 U.S. at 688-89. The plurality opinion stated that the Government had the
burden to demonstrate that it is cheaper to grant benefits to all male members than to
determine which male members are entitled and to grant increased benefits only to
them. The Court noted that, if put to the test, many female "dependents" would not
qualify for benefits. [d. at 689-90.
20. [d. at 690-91.
21. 419 U.S. 498 (1974).
22. The relevant statute, 10 U.S.C. § 6382 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Each officer on the active list of the Navy serving in
the grade of lieutenant, except an officer in the Nurse Corps,
and each officer on the active list of the Marine Corps serving
in the grade of captain shall be honorably discharged on June
30 of the fiscal year in which he is considered as having failed
of selection for promotion to the grade of lieutenant commander or major for the second time. However, if he 80 requests, he may be honorably discharged at any time during
that fiscal year.
(d) This section does not apply to women officers appointed under section 5590 of this title or to officers designated for limited duty.
10 U.s.C. § 6401 (1976) provides in pertinent part:
Each woman officer on the active list of the Navy, appointed under section 5590 of this title, who holds a permanent appointment in the grade of lieutenant and each woman
officer on the active list of the Marine Corps who holds a permanent appointment in the grade of captain shall be honorably discharged on June 30 of the fiscal year in which(1) she is not on a promotion list; and
(2) she has completed 13 years of active commissioned
service in the Navy or in the Marine Corps.
However, if she so requests, she may be honorably discharged
at any time during that fiscal y~.
The effect was that female officers had a thirteen year tenure before they were discharged for want of promotion; male officers, however, could be passed over twice in
fewer years. Lieutenant Ballard was not promoted for nine years. 419 U.S. at 499, 504-06.
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opportunities in the Navy,28 not administrative convenience or
"overbroad generalizations" about women's roles. u In effect, the
Court upheld the statutes because they were designed to remedy
sex discrimination.
In Weinberger u. Wiesenfeld2& the Court overturned a Social Security Act provision28 which awarded death benefits to
widows, but not widowers, calling it "entirely irrational."n A
unanimous Court found that women's financial contributions to
family support were denigrated under the statute/'8 and that
working men and women are similarly situated, thus equally eligible for Social Security death benefits. 28 The Court found the
Social Security statute more pernicious than the dependency
provision in Frontiero because the widower had no chance to
23. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. at 508. The Court's rationale raises its own questions as to job discrimination in the military. J. Goodman's article provides a discussion
of women's unequal treatment in the military, focusing particularly on the effects of the
combat exclusion on women's military careers. See Goodman, supra note 2, at 243.
24. 419 U.S. at 508-10.
25. 420 U.S. 636 (1974). Stephen Wiesenfeld challenged his exclusion from Social
Security survivor's benefits for himself following the death of his wife, who had earned
the principal family income during their marriage. Benefits were awarded to appellee's
BOn but not to him because benefits were available only to women. Id. at 639-40.
26. 420 U.S. at 653. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
(1) The widow and every surviving divorced mother ... of an
individual who died a fully or currently insured individual, if
such widow or surviving divorced mother(A) is not married,
(B) is not entitled to a widow's insurance benefit,
(C) is not entitled to old-age insurance benefits, or is entitled
to old-age insurance benefits each of which is less than threefourths of the primary insurance amount of such individual,
(D) has filed application for mother's insurance benefits, or
was entitled to wife's insurance benefits on the basis of the
wages and self-employment income of such individual for the
month preceding the month in which he died,
(E) at the time of filing such application has in her care a
child of such individual entitled to a child's insurance benefit
. . . shall . . . be entitled to a mother's insurance benefit for
each month ....
27. 420 U.S. at 651. The purpose of amended § 402(g) of the Social Security Act was
to assure protection of the family. However, children of covered female workers were
eligible for survivors' benefits only in limited circumstances, and no benefits were provided for husbands or widowers based on their wives' employment. Id. at 643-44. This
was despite the clear legislative intent "to provide children deprived of one parent with
the opportunity for the personal attention of the other." Id. at 648-49.
28. Id. at 645 (Brennan, J.).
29. Id. at 653.
Women's Law Forum
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prove support or dependence even though the benefits were
based on the woman's employment. 3o
The Court found these "archaic and overbroad" presumptions at the root of Weinberger: (1) male workers' earnings are
vital to family support, whereas women's are not,31 (2) women as
a group prefer child care to employment, when given a choice,
and (3) men who raise children alone prefer work to child
rearing. slI
Despite some uncertainty as to the appropriate degree of judicial scrutiny, the above cases at least evinced a developing rationale as to sex discrimination analysis: Administrative inconvenience and overbroad or archaic generalizations regarding
roles of women would no longer withstand an equal protection
challenge.

Craig v. Boren33 provided the turning point in gender-based
equal protection analysis, because it articulated (but did not formally adopt) a heightened level of scrutinyM by requiring that
any gender-based classification serve an important governmental
purpose and be substantially related to the achievement of that
30. Thus, she not only failed to receive for her family the same protection which a similarly situated male worker would have received,
but she also was deprived of a portion of her own earnings in order
to contribute to the fund out of which benefits would be paid to
others.
rd. at 645. The statute's "effect was to discriminate among surviving children on the
basis of the sex of the surviving parent." rd. at 651.
31. rd. at 643.
32. rd. at 652-53.
33. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). A fourteenth amendment case, Craig u. Boren involved the
constitutionality of an Oklahoma statute which prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to males
under 21 years and females under 18 years. Craig, a male between the ages of 18 and 20,
and Whitener, a licensed vendor of beer, brought the action, charging that males between 18 and 20 years were denied equal protection of the law.
34. In a separate concurrence, Justice Stevens argued the invalidity of gender-based
classifications by quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.:
[Sjince sex, like race and r.ational origin, is an immutable
characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth, the
imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility ....
429 U.S. at 212 n.2 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175
(1972)).
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purpose. III
The Oklahoma statute in Craig burdened males rather than
females. Nevertheless, the Court carefully scrutinized the record
and took exception to the state's use of statistics as verification
of the statute's rationale that teenage boys are more likely to
drink and drive than are teenage girls:3e "Proving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious business, and one
that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that
underlies the Equal Protection Clause."37 The Court found inconsistencies and irrelevancies in the studies and found that the
statistics provided no showing that sexual classification represented a valid substitute for other methods of regulating drinking and driving. The Court concluded that traffic safety
(Oklahoma's state interest) and gender were tenuously connected at best, and that the classification constituted an invidious discrimination against young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty."
By specifically relying on Reed and its progeny, Craig v. Boren synthesized the new equal protection analysis of the preceding five years and again rejected administrative convenience,
archaic or overbroad generalizations about men and women, and
outdated notions of women's place in the home rather than the
"marketplace" or the "world of ideas"3e as bases for genderbased classifications.
Following Craig. a series of sex-discrimination cases came
before the Supreme Court in which the court consistently applied heightened scrutiny, even if the statutes were not always
35. 429 U.S. at 197.
36. Id. at 200-01. The studies showed that although arrests of men ages 18-20 for
drinking and driving significantly exceeded arrests of women the same age, the Court
found the evidence unpersuasive because the disparity increased at later ages. Id. at 200
n.8. Furthermore, random roadside surveys conducted in 1972 and 1973 indicated that as
males grew older their drinking before driving increased somewhat, while females drinking levels remained generally constant. This statistic added nothing to the state's argument that a gender line among teenagers advanced the state's interest of traffic safety.
Id. at 203 n.16.
37. 429 U.S. at 204.

38.1d.
39. Id. at 198-99.

Women's Law Forum

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/5

8

MacDwyer: Rostker v. Goldberg

1982]

ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG

669

struck down. 40 In Califano v. Goldfarb,41 the Court found an old
age benefits scheme, which provided that widowers were ineligible to receive benefits unless they could show prior dependency
of at least fifty per cent upon their deceased wives, to be a violation of the fifth amendment due process clause.
The Court analyzed the legislative history which showed
that the statute's drafters presumed a man generally responsible
for the support of his family48 and compared it to the presumptions in Weinberger. 48 The Court found that, whatever the validity of the law's original assumptions, a gender-based classification could no longer suffice because it unfairly disadvantaged
males by discriminating against the survivors of female contributors." As in Weinberger, women's contributions to family support were denigrated by the legislative scheme411 which rested on
archaic and overbroad generalizations.48
During the same term, in Califano v. Webster, the Court
again applied heightened scrutiny and upheld section 215 of the
Social Security Act. 47 A unanimous Court held the statute had
40. Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 101 S. Ct. 1195 (1981) (striking down on fourteenth
amendment grounds Louisiana statute giving husband unilateral right to dispose of
jointly owned propertY)i Wengler v. Druggist's Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980) (strik·
ing down Missouri statute denying death benefits to widowers unable to prove physical
or mental incapacitation as a violation of fourteenth amendment equal protection)i
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding remedial provision of Social Secur·
ity Act because purpose was to reduce economic disparity between men and women);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1976) (old age benefits statute requiring men to prove
financial dependence of at least 50% struck down under the fifth amendment).
41. 430 U.S. at 202 (1976). C/. Wengler v. Druggist's Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. at 143
(1980).
42. 430 U.S. at 215. See HOSKINS & BIXBY, WOMEN & SOCIAL SECURITY:

LAW AND

No. 42,
at 77 (1973). The original social policy behind the Social Security Act was to benefit the
persons who suffered at the wage earner's death, namely the wage eamer's dependents.
Therefore, dependency, not need, was the criterion for inclusion. 430 U.S. at 213·14. In
1950, the benefits changed, and there is no evidence that Congress intended different
treatment for the benefit of non-dependent wives. ld. at 216. Assumptions about support
and dependency, however, cannot justify sex-based discrimination in the distribution of
employment-related benefits. ld. at 217.
43. 420 U.S. at 643. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
44. 430 U.S. at 208.
45. ld. at 206.
46. Id. at 211.
47. 430 U.S. 313,316 (1976). Before it was amended in 1972, the section provided in
pertinent part:
(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), the number of an individPOLICY IN FIVE COUNTRIES, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH REPORT
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an important governmental purpose: reducing the economic disparity between men and women caused by this country's long
history of sex discrimination. 48 The statute established different
methods of computing elapsed years of employment, thereby
slightly advantaging retired female workers in their monthly
benefit. 48
Referring to Ballard, the Court found that this favorable
treatment of women was not based on archaic notions of women,IiO nor was it "protective" legislation. Significantly, the statute's purpose was to reinedy past discrimination by integrating
women into the "marketplace."II.
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The statute challenged in Goldberg was the 1948 Military
Selective Service Act (MSSA),III which provided for the achievement and maintenance of an adequate armed strength to insure
the nation's security. iii Included in the MSSA was a section reuaI's elapsed years is the number of calendar y8AJ'll after 1950
. . . and before-(A) in the case of a WOmaD, the year in which
she died, or if it occuned earlier but after 1960, the year in
which she attained age 62.
(C) in the case of a man who has not died, the year occurring
after 1960 in which he attained (or would attain) llie 65.
42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3) (amended 1972).
48. 430 U.S. at 317 .. Cf. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 355 (1974) (State tax law
discriminated in favor of women; however, c1aaaification was not arbitrary because statute advanced social policy of cushioning financial impact of 8pousal loss on persons particulerly burdened.).
49. 430 U.S. at 314-16. "Whether from overt diacrimination or from the socialization
process of a male-dominated culture, the job merket is inh08pitable to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid jobs." rd. at 318. Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 353 (1974).
Therefore, allowing women to eliminate extra low-earning y8AJ'll from their calculations
for social security benefits directly remedies years of diacrimination. 430 U.S. at 318.
SO. 430 U.S. at 317. See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1974) (Naval male
and female line officers are not similarly situated; hence, different treatment does not
reflect archaic and overbroad generalizations.).
51. Ct. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975) (Utall statute establishing child support requirements based on gender of child struck down for ita effect of perpetuating
role-typing and limiting options for female children).
52. M.S.S.A., ch. 625, 62 Stat. 604 (1948) (current version at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451473 (1981».
53. 50 U.S.C. App. § 451(b) (1981).
The CongreBB further declares that in a free lOCiety the obligations and privileges of serving in the armed forces and the reserve components thereofshould be shared generally, in accorWomen's Law Forum

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss3/5

10

MacDwyer: Rostker v. Goldberg

1982J

ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG

671

QUIrIng registration of men between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-six. 1W Registration procedures, however, were revoked by
President Ford in March 1975 who intended to revise them.1I&
In response to the Soviet armed invasion of Mghanistan,
President Carter announced in his 1980 State of the Union Address the necessity of reinstituting military registration." As an
integral part of renewed registration, President Carter recommended that the MSSA be modified to include women.87
Congress conducted hearings, inviting testimony from military commanders and Department of Defense representatives."
During those hearings the registration of women was debated at
length, resulting in persuasive testimony from both military and
administrative witnesses that: (1) there were no administrative
dance with a system of selection which is fair and just, and
which is consistent with the maintenance of an effective na·
tional economy.
50 U.S.C. App. § 451(c) (1981).
54. 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 provides in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this title . . ., it shall be the
duty of every male citizen of the United States, and every
other male person residing in the United States, who, on the
day or days fixed for the first or any subsequent registration,
is between the ages of eighteen and twenty·six, to present
himself for and submit to registration at such time or times
and place or places, and in such manner, as shall be deter·
mined by proclamation of the President and by rules and reg·
ulations prescribed hereunder.
55. Proclamation No. 4360, 40 Fed. Reg. 14,567 (1975), which provided in pertinent
part: "[I)n order to evaluate an annual registration system, existing procedures are being
terminated and will be replaced by new procedures which will provide for periodic
registration. "
The result was the highly controversial All·Volunteer Army. By 1979, Congress and
the military expressed substantial doubt that the country's security needs were ade·
quately met by the system. Complaints included increased "difficulty in recruiting suffi·
cient manpower to meet active duty levels," substantial deficiency in numbers of the
Selected Reserve-the units which would augment active military forces in a time of
mobilization-and critical shortages of doctors and other skilled personnel. S. REP. No.
96-197, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS
1820-21.
56. 16 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 198 (Jan. 23, 1980).
57. PRES. RECOMMENDATIONS POR SELECTIVE SUVJCE REpORM-A REPORT TO CON·
GRESS PREPARED PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 96-107 (Feb. 11, 1980).
58. Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1981:
Hearings on S. 2294 Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
1678 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 2294).
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obstacles to registering women as well as men,09 (2) even in a
time of mobilization women would be useful and necessary for
support functions,80 (3) studies showed women's performance in
the military is high, including under tested field conditions with
sexually mixed units,8} (4) in some areas of the military women
perform with skill superior to men,82 and (5) women would provide a valuable addition to the national registration poo1.8S
59. 409 F. Supp. at 599 n.18 (quoting deposition of Bernard R08tker, Director of
Selective Service System (May 1,3, 1980».
60. Id. at 600-02. Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Pirie projected that by
1985,250,000 women will be on active duty in the military. If there were a mobilization,
80,000 additional women could be used. Hearings on S. 2294, supra note 58 (testimony
of Robert B. Pirie, Jr.) (March 5, 1980).
During the Korean War, the Department of Defense unsuccessfully attempted to
recruit 100,000 women to meet personnel needs. 509 F. Supp. at 600 n.22 (citing U.S.
DRP'" 0' DE'ENSE, BACKGROUND STUDy-USE 0' WOMEN IN THE MILITARY 3 (2d ed.
1978». Therefore, if mobilization were to occur, the Department of Defense could not
rely on filling all of its support jobs with women volunteers. 509 F. Supp. at 600 n.22.
61. 509 F. Supp. at 604 n.30. "The performance of women in our Armed Forces
today strongly supports the conclusion that many of the best Qualified people for some
military jobs in the 18-26 age category will be women. The Administration strongly believes they should be available for services in the jobs they can do." Hearings on S. 2294,
supra note 58 (testimony of Robert B. Pirie, Jr.) (March 5, 1980). See Owens v. Brown,
455 F. Supp. 291, 295 (D.D.C. 1978) (No Navy report evaluating male and female capabilities has revealed that women lack the native ability to perform competently in positions now held only by men). Another report found: "Our experience with the enlisted
women has been very good. The quality is high; the performance is high; the capabilities
are outstanding." Goodman, supra note 2, at 255-56 n.114. See also Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 10929 and H.R. 7431 Before the House Comm. on Armed Seruices. 95th Cong, 2d Sess. 1179-88 (1978). For a discussion of military exercises conducted in 1977 and 1978 to study women's performance in mixed units under field
conditions, see Goodman, supra note 2, at 257; 126 CONGo REc. S6548 (daily ed. June 10,
1981) (remarks of Sen. Hatfield).
62. 101 St. Ct. at 2665 n.8 (Marshall, J. dissenting). According to the Senate Armed
Services Committee:
(Bjasically the evidence has come before this committee that
participation of women in the All Volunteer Force has worked
well, has been praised by every military officer who has testified before the committee, and that the jobs are being performed with the same, if not in some cases, with superior skill.
Hearings on S. 2294, supra note 58, at 1678 (remarks of Sen. Cohen).
63. 509 F. Supp. at 600 n.20 ("The current uniform opinion of the armed services
and Department of Defense is that women inductees could be utilized, and that it would
be valuable to include women in the pool of registrants available for the draft."). "The
representatives of the various armed services all testified that they would have no objection to the registration of women." Id. at 603 n.30. During the Senate debate, some senators spoke enthusiastically about women's role in the military. For example:
Let me begin by saying that there is a clear military justification to register women. I have had an opportunity to study the
role women now play in our military forces, and I have been
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Underlying the Administration's recommendation to include
women in any registration scheme was its conviction that equity
demanded universal registration." A Defense Department witness testified:
The President's decision to ask for authority to
register women is based on equity. It is a recognition of the reality that both men and women are
working members of our society and confirms
what is already obvious throughout our society-that women are now providing all types of
skills in every profession. The military is no exception. Since women have proven that they can
serve successfully as volunteers in the Armed
Forces, equity suggests that they be liable to serve
as draftees if conscription is reinstituted.II

Despite persuasive evidence from the Administration and
impressed by it, and let me spell out those conclusions that I
have reached 88 a result of this study.
First, women in noncombat positions have made significant contributions to the military . . . .
Second, in the event of mobilization there will be a military role for an increased number of women . • . .
The Manpower Subcommittee has also had the opportunity to study the Maxivac and the Kostker reports which indicate that the Armed Forces could absorb up to a 35-percent
female base without in any way interfering with combat
readiness.
So while there may not be a military need for women,
there is a significant military justification for using them in a
period of mobilization.
126 CONGo REc. S6536 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Cohen).
64. Kostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. at 2659.
65. 509 F. Supp. at 605 n.31. Proposed Reinstitution of MSSA: Heari1ll' Before the
Subcomm. on Mil. Personnel of the Armed Services Comm. of the House of Representative., 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (March 5, 1980) (statement of Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics).
By "considerations of equity", the military experts acknowledged that female conscripts can perform 88 well 88 male conscripts in certain positions, and that there is therefore no reason why one group should be totally excluded from
registration and a draft. Thus what the majority t!O blithely
dismisses 88 "equity" is nothing less than the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws which "requires that Congress treat similarly situated persons
similarly. "
101 S. Ct. at 2671 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the military that women would enhance the armed forces, Congress virtually ignored both the factual testimony and the equal
protection policy and voted to exclude women from
registration.ee
66. 101 S. Ct. at 2649. Included in the Joint Resolution passed by the House on
April 22, 1980 and by the Senate on June 12, 1980, were the following specific findings:
(1) Article I, section 8 of the Constitution commits exclusively
to the Congress the powers to raise and support armies, provide and maintain a Navy, and makes rules for Government
and regulation of the land and naval forces, and pursuant to
these powers it lies within the discretion of the Congress to
determine the occasions for expansion of our Armed Forces,
and the means best suited to such expansion should it prove
necessary.
(2) An ability to mobilize rapidly is essential to the preservation of our national security.
(3) A functioning registration system is a vital part of any mobilization plan.
(4) Women make an important contribution to our national
defense, and are volunteering in increasing numbers for our
armed services.
(5) Women should not be intentionally or routinely placed in
combat positions in our military services.
(6) There is no established military need to include women in
a selective service system.
(7) Present manpower deficiencies under the All-Volunteer
Force are concentrated in the combat arms-infantry, armor,
combat engineers, field artillery and air defense.
(8) If mobilization were to be ordered in a wartime scenario,
the primary manpower need would be for combat
replacements.
(9) The need to rotate personnel and the possibility that close
support units could come under enemy fire also limits the use
of women in non-combat jobs.
(10) If the law required women to be drafted in equal numbers
with men, mobilization would be severely impaired because of
strains on training facilities and administrative lIystems.
(11) Under the administration's proposal there is no proposal
for exemption of mothers of young children. The administration has given insufficient attention to necessary changes in
Selective Service rules, such as those governing the induction
of young mothers, and to the strains on family life that would
result from the registration and possible induction of women.
(12) A registration and induction system which excludes women is constitutional.
S. REP. No. 96-826, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 160 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODB CONGo
& AD. NBws 2650-51 [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 96-826).
In concluding that a registration and induction system involving only male citizens is the best course to insure the country's
preparedness and its ultimate ability to protect itself, the
committee was mindful of arguments made by some critics of
Women's Law Forum
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Although Congress claimed that it reviewed the issue constitutionally,67 it repeatedly framed the question improperly. Instead of asking whether there was substantial justification for
excluding women from registration, Congress asked whether the
Constitution required that women be included."
Rather than examine the issue of women and registration,
Congress mistakenly focused on women and combat.tII Congress
justified exclusion because: (1) although historically women have
defended themselves, they have never been asked to engage in
aggressive combat,70 (2) sexually mixed military units involve
unknoWn risks,71 (3) women in combat might affect the national
resolve in wartime,n (4) there was no military need to draft women (because a sufficient number of men would be available),71
(5) military flexibility would be threatened by the inclusion of
registration that the Constitution requires both men and women to be treated equally. The argument rests on an interpretation of the principle of equal protection that would mandate
an equal sharing among men and women of the burden of registration and conscription. The committee has carefully considered constitutional arguments raised in detailed statements
from opponents of a male-only registration and induction system. In the committee's view, the arguments for treating men
and women equally-so compelling in many areas of our national life-simply cannot overcome the judgment of our military leaders and of the Congress itself that a male-only system
best serves our national security.
Id. at 159, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2649.
67. 101 S. Ct. at 2651.
68. Goldberg V. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. at 596-97; see supra note 11.
69. S. REP. No. 96-826 supra note 66 at 157, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 2647.
The committee remains convinced that registration is vitally
necessary and that women should not be included in any registration and induction system. This judgment is based upon
the committee's assessment of the military needs of the Nation, and its comprehensive study of the registration issue. It
is also based on the committee's assessment of the societal impact of the registration and possible induction of women.
Id.
70. Goodman, supra note 2, at 260.
71. S. REP. No. 96-826, supra note 66 at 157, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo &
AD. NEWS 2647.
72.1d.
73. 509 F. Supp. at 599 (Congress' Specific Finding No. '6: "There is no military
need to include women in a selective service system"). Congress' specific findings are set
out in full supra note 66.
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women,74 and (6) registering all women and inducting a token
number would be an unsatisfactory solution; however, inducting
all registered women would be administratively impossible.7&
Congress' list of considerations assumed that registration
equills the first step of conscription, which eventuates in mobilization-Le., combat----despite the fact that military witnesses defined registration as merely a means by which the pool of available young people could be measured. 7• The argument that
registering women would require their inevitable inclusion in
combat, should the country mobilize, ignores Naval and Air
Force statutes and Army and Marine Corps policies prohibiting
women's combat participation. 77 Consequently, Congress and the
military would have to rewrite law and policy before women
would be allowed into battle. Thus the argument is irrelevant
and fails to focus on the actual intent and scope of the proposed
legislation. 78
Congress also reasoned that women would not be excluded
wholly from military service in any event because they were al74. 509 F. Supp. at 598. However, according to the Selective Service System, 72
countries have military conscription, of which 10 register or conscript both men and women. rd. at 599 n.1S.
75. rd. at 598. The committee confused the issue: The numbers of men or women to
be drafted would always be a decision made by the military. In the proposed legislation
there was no provision to include equal numbers of men and women if a draft were
required; there was no provision for any draft specifications. Other administrative
problems which the committee foresaw included housing and physical standards. As the
District Court observed, "Women in the military as a group Buffer only about half the
lost time of men." rd. at 599, n.1S. The height and weight differences between men and
women are analogous to those between Caucasian and Asian men. Those differences have
not inhibited excellent performance among Asian men. rd.
76. rd. at 602.
77. 10 U.S.C. § 6015 (1976) ("women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in
aircraft that are engaged in combat missions"); 10 U.S.C. § 8549 (1976) (female Air Force
members "may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat missions"). The
Army and Marine Corps preclude women from combat by established policy. 101 S. Ct.
at 2657 (citing J.A. 86, 34, 58).
78. The District Court summarized the Government's argument as follows:
[W]omen cannot fill all positions in the armed services, especially combat positions; in a time of mobilization the primary
need of the military services will be in combat related positions and in support position personnel who can readily be
deployed into combat; therefore, in order to maximize the
flexibility of personnel management, women should be excluded from the MSSA.
rd. at 599-600.
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lowed to volunteer.'79 This argument begged the issue of whether
a registration scheme which excluded women unfairly burdened
men as a class and denied equality of opportunity and responsibility to women. 80
The bias underlying Congress' irrelevant conclusions was
exposed in a single sentence of the subcommittee report that
recommended both houses vote to exclude women from registration because of the "military needs of the Nation. . . . [And]
the committee's assessment of the societal impact of the registration and possible induction of women. "81 The committee's
assessment was purely speculative; nowhere did the committee
attempt to verify its conclusion.
Following the introduction of the committee report and recommendation, Senator Kassebaum81 offered an amendment to
the proposed MSSA funding allocation which would have precluded any allocation of funds if the system did not include women.88 After lengthy debate, the Senate rejected the Kassebaum
amendment. 8 • On July 2, 1980, President Carter reinstituted
military registration to include males only."
79. 101 S. Ct. at 2660.
80. Ct. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,538 (1974). In Taylor, a jury system which
in practice excluded women (who constituted 53% of the eligible jurors oC a community)

was held unconstitutional even though women could volunteer Cor service by submitting
a written declaration of desire to serve.
81. S. REP. No. 96-826, supra note 66, at 157, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONGo & AD.
NEWS 2647 (emphasis added).
82. (R. Kansas). In June, 1980, she was the only female senator.
83. H.R.J. Res. 521, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). Pub. L. No. 96-282, 94 Stat. 552
(1980) was amended to read:
Provided: That none of the funds made available by this joint
reaolution shall be available for instituting or taking action to
drart any individual Cor military service or be used for production of any selective service form used for classification which
does not permit a registrant to have the option of stating that
such registrant is conscientiously opposed to participation in
war in any form pursuant to section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act.
The Kassebaum-Levin amendment would have added the following language arter the
word "Act": "or shall be made available for implementing a system of registration which
does not include women." 126 CONGo REC. S6544 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (remarks of
Sen. Nunn).
84. 126 CONGo REC. S6549 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (40 yeas, 51 nays, 9 abstentions).
85. Proclamation No. 4771, 45 Fed. Reg. 45,247 (1980).
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III. COURT'S ANALYSIS OF ROSTKER v. GOLDBERG

A.

JUDICIAL DEFERENCE

Justice Rehnquist, writing the majority opinion in Goldberg,
constructed a rationale which is logically flawed, analytically
confused and generally unpersuasive. He began by declaring that
the C.ourt must defer to the congressional determination to exclude women from registration, because of what he called a clear
history of judicial deference in constitutionally mandated areas. 88 The majority argument was skewed because it did not acknowledge the uneven and controversial history of judicial deference. 87 The Court, beginning in the Warren era, had intervened
when important constitutional issues, especially equal protection, were at stake,88 a fact which Justice Rehnquist ignored
when he assembled his line of cases to bolster the majority's deferential posture. 88
The Goldberg majority wrote that the judiciary owes particular deference to Congress in the regulation of military affairs,
because such decisions demand specific competence and are
"complex, subtle and professional" in areas of training, equipping and controlling the military force. 8o The Court argued that
Congress is qualified to regulate such affairs, whereas the Court
is not. 81 The majority, however, did not substantiate its position
that the expertise of Congress exceeds it own-a notable
omission.
The deference argument is illustrative of the weakness and
analytical confusion of the majority opinion. The Court cited
Gilligan v. Morgan, a free speech case, to establish the Court's
86. 101 S. Ct. at 2651-55.
87. See generally, Gunther, In Search of an Evolving Doctrine on a Changing
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); Simson, A
Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection Clause, 29
STAN. L. REv. 663 (1977); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 1065 (1969).
88. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1968).
89. 101 S. Ct. at 2651-55.
90. Id. at 2651.
91. Id. at 2652. But see Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 181, 188 (1962) ("When the authority of the military has such a sweeping capacity
for affecting the lives of our citizenry, the wisdom of treating the military establishment
as an enclave beyond the reach of civilian courts almost inevitably is drawn into
question. ").
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non-competence in military affairs.'a In Gilligan, however, the
Court limited its deference: "[W]e neither hold nor imply that
the conduct of the National Guard is always beyond judicial review or that there may not be accountability in a judicial forum
for violations of law or for specific unlawful conduct by military
personnel . . . ."81
While another cited case, Orloff v. Willoughby,94 can be
read to support the argument that the judiciary lacks competence to review military decisions, the issue there was at least
fully reviewed by the Court.1I1 Despite the result, the opinion
suggests that the Court deferred to Congress because it concurred with the result of the case."
In Parker v. Levy the Army court-martialled a military physician for disobedience, disloyal and disrespectful remarks made
to his subordinates, and conduct unbecoming an officer.lI? Although the Court ultimately deferred on a constitutional issue, it
spent thirty pages discussing the merits of the case.
These cases weaken the majority's argument that the judiciary generally and properly defers to Congress in areas constitutionally encompassing the Congressional prerogative. liS They
92. 101 S. Ct. at 2652 (citing Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I, 10 (1972)). In Gilligan
the Court held it could not adjudicate charges that the National Guard unnecessarily
used lethal force to quell campus disturbances, because the Constitution vests such surveillance power in the legislative and executive branches of government.
93. 413 U.S. I, 11-12 (1972).
94. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. at 2655 (quoting Orloff v. Willoughby, 345
U.S. 83, 94 (1952) ("The military constitutes a specialized community governed by a
separate discipline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate Army matters as the Army must be
scrupulous not to intervene in judicial matters,").
95. The Court admonished the Government that it properly admitted its responsibility to use professionals in their skilled areas, affirmed that the President was justified
in refusing a commission to appellant, and removed itself from examining whether Orloff
should be specially assigned. Orloff'v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 87-93 (1952),
96. "Could this Court, whatever power it might have in the matter, rationally hold
that the President must, or even ought to, issue the certificate to one who will not answer
whether he is a member of the Communist Party?" ld. at 91.
97. 417 U.S. 733 (1974). The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) provides
punishment for disobedience, insubordination, improper conduct. Art. 90 (10 U.S.C. §
890 (2) (1976)) prohibits willful disobedience of a lawful command of a superior commissioned officer; Art. 133 (10 U.S.C. § 933 (1976)) prohibits any disorders and negligences
which lead to lack of good order and discipline in the armed forces.
98, See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1968) (invalidating House of Repre-
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demonstrate the Court's history of mixed review and deference
when hearing cases involving the military.

B.

EQUAL PROTECTION AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

Military cases involving equal protection challenges even
more persuasively argue against the majority's assertion of deference; in those cases the Court consistently has reviewed the
equal protection issue.
In Frontiero 99 the Court examined Congress' intent in passing discriminatory legislation to attract career personnel,l°O cited
the factors announced in Reed,lOl and held that administrative
convenience could not withstand the equal protection interest at
stake. 101 The plurality opinion closely examined this country's
history of sex discrimination 108 and recommended that genderbased classifications be subject to strict scrutiny.l04
Clearly the Frontiero Court did not view the question as a
purely military one or as one deserving deference. Instead, it
scrutinized the governmental purpose, the effect of the statute
in furthering stereotypical sex roles,lOo and finally invalidated
the classification as invidious. 106
Although Ballard upheld the Navy provisions which created
different promotion standards for men and women,10'7 the Balsentatives' denial of seat to Adam Clayton Powell who had been charged with misappropriation of public funds). "Our system of government requires that federal courts on
occasion interpret the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction given
the document by another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may
cause cannot justify the courts' avoiding their constitutional responsibility." 1d. at 549.
99. For a brief discussion of Frontiero v. Richardson see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
100. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 679 (1972).
101. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). For a discussion of the factors outlawed by
Reed. see supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
102. 411 U.S. at 690-91.
103. 1d. at 684-88.
104. 1d. at 688. "With these considerations in mind, we can only conclude that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage. or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."
1d.
105. 1d. at 688-90.
106. 1d. at 690-91.
107. For a discussion of Schlesinger v. Ballard. see supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
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lard Court reviewed the law and recent equal protection case
historyl08 in reaching its decision. The Court distinguished Ballard from both Frontiero and Reed by finding no overbroad generalizations in the Navy policy.lo8 The male and female naval
officers in Ballard were not similarly situated;llo therefore, the
legislative classification was rational because it compensated women for reduced career opportunities. l l l The Ballard Court also
determined that administrative convenience was not the basis of
the law,ll2 and specifically found that the statute served the flow
of military promotions and reflected current Navy needs.1I8

Thus, while the Court regards legislative acts most seriously
and sometimes defers to Congress by acknowledging Congress'
prerogative in certain constitutional areas, the Court has not always refused to review military affairs questions and has often
adjudicated those involving equal protection challenges. In this
context, it is plain that when Goldberg came before the Court,
the Court had decided precedent by which to review the equal
protection argument and deliberately chose not to do so.

C.

THE

Goldberg

EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

While refusing to label Goldberg either a strictly military
case or a sex discrimination case, the Court did acknowledge
that Craig requires the articulation of an important governmental interest, which the Court identified as "raising and supporting armies. "11' There was no proof, however, that registering women would interfere with the smooth functioning of the military.
In fact, the opposite was true. m Even assuming the important
interest was articulated, the Court should have analyzed
whether a gender-based classification was substantially related
to raising and supporting armies. Instead, the Court adopted the
lOS. Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 49S, 506-07 (1974).
109. [d. at 50S.
110. [d. The Court noted that "[t)he complete rationality of this legislative classifi-

cation is underscored by the fact that in corps where male and female lieutenants are
similarly situated, Congress has not differentiated between them with respect to tenure."
[d. at 509.
111. [d. at 50S.
112. [d. at 510.
113. [d.

114. 101 S. Ct. at 2654.
115. For a discussion of testimony before congressional subcommittees regarding
women's roles in the military, see supra notes 59-6S and accompanying text.
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congressional finding that a male-only registration more efficiently serves national security.u8
The Court then announced the direction of its analysis:
When a congressional decision is challenged "on equal protection grounds, the question a court must decide is not which alternative it would have chosen, had it been the primary decisionmaker, but whether that chosen by Congress denies equal
protection of the laws."m However, the Court never reviewed
whether Congress' alternative denied equal protection. Instead
the Court became bogged down in the issue of judicial deference
and whether women ought to be put into combat.
The Court improperly relied on Ballard again, arguing that
the case best demonstrated the reconciliation achieved between
Congress and the Court, without noting that intermediate scrutiny had been applied there.ll8 The Court also cited Orloff v.
Willoughby, even though that case had nothing to do with gender-based classifications, and, as has been established already,
the Court applies a separate standard in military cases which
involve equal protection challenges. ll8
The majority was particularly disingenuous in asserting that
"[w]e cannot ignore Congress' broad authority conferred by the
Constitution to raise and support armies when we are urged to
declare unconstitutional its studied choice of one alternative in
preference to another for furthering that goal. "110 The Court neglected to state the constitutional importance of the "8Iternative"-equality under the law. And by deferring so thoroughly to
Congress' findings,lU the Court ignored the obvious inconsis116. 101 S. Ct. at 2660. The Court emphasized administrative burdens involved in
drafting women during mobilization, citing alleged training and housing problems, and
the detrimental effect on military flexibility. However, the proposed legislation did not
include mobilization plans and, as the dissent points out, in case of mobilization the
military would properly determine its immediate needs. Id. at 2673. Furthermore. Congress offered no proof that registering women was detrimental to the smooth operation of
the military. See supra notes 59-65.
117. 101 S. Ct. at 2654 (emphasis added).
118. Id.
119. For a discussion of the Court's equal protection analysis in military cases see
supra notes 99-113 and accompanying text.
120. 101 S. Ct. at 2655.
121. Such deference had not been the former position of this Court: "This Court

need not in equal protection cases accept at face value assertions of legislative purposes,
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tency between the congressional findings and the military and
administration testimony,122 inconsistencies similar to those expressly rejected in Craig.
The majority erred just as Congress did by adopting the
idea that registration means a draft which inevitably results in
combat123 and that combat restrictions form the basis of the exclusion of women from registration. 1I4 However, Congress did
not determine that drafting women would be harmful to the military, only that there was no necessity to draft women.
Even assuming women would be drawn into combat, the
Government could not produce any factual studies to support its
argument that women could not perform well on the battlefield.
In fact, military studies have shown the opposite.l2 11 And even if
women were to be legitimately barred from combat, they could
fill support positions in the United States and rear areas. lIs
However, combat was not the issue of the registration statute,
when an examination of the legislative scheme and its history demonstrates that the
asserted purpose could not have been a goal of the legislation." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 n.16 (1974).
122. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text for discussion of subcommittee
testimony.
123. 101 S. Ct. at 2657. "Any assessment of the congressional purpose and its chosen
means must therefore consider the registration scheme as a prelude to a draft in a time
of national emergency...' . The purpose of registration, therefore, was to prepare for a
draft of combat troops." [d.
124. [d. Combat is difficult to define. In military parlance it apparently has no technical or general meaning. Congress gave the Secretary of Defense six months to submit a
definition, to which he responded: Combat is "engaging an enemy or being engaged by
the enemy in an armed conflict;" and a person is "in combat" if "he or she is in a geographical area designated as a combat/hostile fire zone by the Secretary of Defense
. . . . " The Secretary conceded that under this definition women had been in combat in
combat zones in World War II and earlier. Goodman, supra note 2, at 258.
125. Goodman, supra note 2, at 255-57. The performance of women was evaluated
by the Army during 72-hour field exercises in which the percentage of women varied up
to 35% of total personnel in combat support and combat service support companies. The
result: The proportion of women had no negative effect on performance. [d. at 256-57
(citing U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, WOMEN CONTENT IN UNITS FORCE DEVELOPMENT TEST (MAX/WAC) (1977)) [hereinafter cited
as 1977 WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT TEsT). During annual war games in Germany, women's
performance was studied. In a 30-day sustained combat exercise women "did not impair
the performance of combat support and combat service support units." Goodman, supra
note 2, at 257.
126. 101 S. Ct. at 2668 (citing National Service Legislation: Hearings on H.R. 6569
before the Subcomm. on Military Personnel of the House Comm. on Armed Services,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (testimony of Robert B. Pirie, Jr., Ass't Secretary of Defense)
(unpublished)).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

23

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 3 [1982], Art. 5

684

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:661

and Congress' and the Court's preoccupation with it was extraneous, although ultimately conclusive to their respective
decisions. 117
The majority asserted that the exemption of women from
registration was "closely related" to the governmental objective lSB without having honored a proper equal protection review,
without acknowledging the clear inconsistencies between congressional testimony and findings, and without establishing a basis for blatant archaic and overbroad generalizations about women. The Government did not establish that men and women
are not similarly situated as to combat, and it did not satisfactorily confront the essential issue of whether men and women are
similarly situated as to registration. 118
D.

JUSTICE MARSHALL'S DISSENT

Justice Marshall's dissent 180 clarified the errors of the majority opinion: (1) the case presents one question: Whether the
exclusion of women from the MSSA contravenes the equal protection component of the fifth amendment, III (2) heightened
scrutiny must be applied because a purely gender-based classification is at issue, 111 and (3) the Government failed to carry the
burden of showing the substantial relation between the statute's
discriminatory means and asserted governmental objective. 111
Additionally, the Court never asked whether some less restrictive alternative was available to accomplish the Government's
purpose. 1M
127. "The policy precluding the use of women in combat is, in the committee's view,
the moat important reason for not including women in a registration system." S. REP.
No. 96·826, supra note 66, at 157, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2647,
cited in 101 S. Ct. at 2658.
128. 101 S. Ct. at 2658. "The exemption of women from registration is not only
sufficiently but closely related to Congress' purpose in authorizing their registration,
since the purpose of registration is to develop a pool of potential combat troops." rd.
129. "[Tlhe burden remains on the party seeking to uphold a statute that expressly
discriminates on the basis of BeX to advance an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for
the challenged classification." Kirchberg V. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (Louisiana
statute empowering husband to unilaterally alienate property declared unconstitutional
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.).
130. 101 S. Ct. at 2662 (which Brennan, J., joined).
131. rd.
132. rd. at 2663.
133. rd.
134. Ct. Dothard V. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1976) (Title VII prohibits statutory
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As for the Court's deference,
One . . . safeguar[ d] of essential liberties is the
Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection
of the laws. When, as here, a federal law that classifies on the basis of gender is challenged as violating this constitutional guarantee, it is ultimately for. this Court, not Congress, to decide
whether there exists the constitutionally required
close and substantial relationship between the
discriminatory means employed and the asserted
governmental objective. 180

Justice Marshall's opening and most compelling point, one
which he regrettably did not elaborate on, was that Congress'
decision and the majority's affirmation constituted an
"[i]mprimatur on one of the most potent remaining public expressions of 'ancient canards about the proper role of
.
women.' "186
IV. CRITIQUE: ROSTKER V. GOLDBERG AND APPLICATION OF THE CRAIG TEST

Rostker v. Goldberg fits logically into the Craig line of cases
because the exclusion of women from military registration is
based on a constitutionally sensitive criterion-sex alone. As in
Weinberger, Craig, and Goldfarb, males based their claim on the
principle that the. law unfairly burdened them as a class and
benefitted females.187 The Goldberg factors parallel those in
height and weight requirements excluding 40% of the female population but only 1 % of
the male population from job as correctional counselor.). The Court recommended individual testing, fairly administered, rather than overbroad classifications, to determine
physical strength equal to job requirement. [d. at 332.
135. 101 S. Ct. at 2664. "When it appears that an Act of Congress conflicts with [a
constitutional) provisio[n), we have no choice but to enforce the paramount commands
of the Constitution. We are sworn to do no less." [d. at 2676 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 104 (1958».
136. 101 S. Ct. at 2662 (Marshall, J. dissenting) (quoting Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971) (Marshall, J. concurring».
137. Goldberg v. Rostker, 509 F. Supp. 586, 588 (E.D. Pa. 1980). The District Court
stated plaintiffs' constitutional argument as follows:
[TJheir rights to equal protection of the law, as that concept is
included in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment,
are violated in that males only are subject to registration for
the draft, and therefore there is an increased probability of
the male plaintiffs actually being inducted because the pool of
draft eligibles is decreased by the exclusion of females.
[d.; Goldberg v. Tarr, 510 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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prior sex-discrimination equal protection challenges: As to military registration, males and females were similarly situated but
treated differently; the classification was based on archaic and
overbroad generalizations regarding women's roles, and the classification could not be upheld on the basis of its administrative
expedience. The difficulty in applying equal protection analysis
to Goldberg did not center on identifying the important governmental objective. There is no dispute that national security, and
more particularly the raising of armed forces, is an important
government objective, although there was no showing that registering or even drafting women would be detrimental to that interest. The difficulty arose in establishing the substantial relatedness between the important governmental objective and the
gender-based classification. l18
What the Goldberg majority failed to do-and what is critical to a proper equal protection analysis-was to inquire beyond
Congress' specific findings and discover the actual purpose of
the gender-based classification. l i t That necessarily involves scrutiny of the legislation's language, history and structure. Given
the inconsistent conclusions resulting from subcommittee hearings and the congressional findings, the Court had every reason
to make such an inquiry, which it chose not to do.
There were factors which made the Goldberg classification
clearly questionable. Military and Defense Department witnesses testified that the quality of women's contribution to the
All-Volunteer force equalled, and at times exceeded, men's contributions,140 which underlines the argument that women enhance the effectiveness of a military force. Military studies show
that in field exercises women did not reduce the effectiveness of
their units. l • l This suggests that stereotypes about women's
physical weakness and emotional instability cannot be supported factually. Experiments involving men and women living
138. For a discussion of the difficulty in correlating the objective sought by a statute
or rule with classifications which are gender-baaed, see Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291
(1978).
139. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1086.
140. For a brief discussion of women's excellent performance in the military, see
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
141. For a description of women's performance in field exercises, see supra note 125
and accompanying text.
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and working together in close quarters showed no reduction in
discipline or morale,l42 which suggests that with training and
proJ:'er management there would be no significant adverse effects
to mixed units of soldiers.
Given this unrefuted evidence, it can be concluded that the
inclusion of women in the military does not reduce military effectiveness and, by logical extension, that women's exclusion
from the military cannot be proved to increase military effectiveness. That is the constitutional question: Does the exclusion
of women as a class promote the important governmental objective of advancing an effective armed force? The answer clearly is
that it does not.
The other proper line of inquiry is whether the congressional basis reflects stereotypical or overbroad generalizations
about the role of women. 148 Case history shows that such classifications cannot pass constitutional muster.l44 One Senator's remarks about women and the family, made during the debate on
Senator Kassebaum's proposed amendment, suggests that stereotypical notions of women's proper place abound in certain governmental quarters. l411
142. Owens v. Brown, 455 F. Supp. 291, 308·09 (D.D.C. 1978). The Commander of
the Atlantic Fleet has said commanding officers have "sufficient authority" to deal with
individuals who have problems adjusting to mixed crews aboard Navy vessels: "Adjust·
ment and thawing of preciously held barriers to the presence of women and acceptance
by the male ship's company are social facts of life which must be recognized and dealt
with." [d. at 309 (citing Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs Second Interrogatories, Nos.
37-39 & Attach 7). The Chief of Naval Operations compared adjusting to mixed crews
with adjusting to mixed dormitories on college campuses: Careful planning is required.
[d. (citing Defendant's Answers to Plaintiffs Second Interrogatories, Nos. 37·39 & Attach
7, Third Endorsement on USS Sanctuary, at 6).
143. L. TRIBE, supra note 10, at 1089·92.
144. See Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1974), discussed supra notes 25·32
(finding irrational a Social Security Act provision which denigrated women's financial
contributions to family support and was based on "archaic and overbroad" generaliza·
tions about women); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1972), discussed supra notes
18·20 (Air Force statute which prescribed that male dependents prove their financial
dependence on their spouses before being eligible for benefits struck down as undermin·
ing females' developing social roles).
•
145. Maybe I am old fashioned, and I am sure some people will accuse
me of living in the 18th or 19th century, but I was brought up to
believe that the basic fundamental unit of Government in this
country was the family. This country was based on the family unit
and a belief in God, and a belief in a religious heritage of
whatever denomination, and that a family was composed of a
mother and a father and children ....
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Rostker v. Goldberg, properly analyzed under heightened

scrutiny, cannot stand. Although Congress' decision complies
with the first requirement of the test by having an articulable,
important government objective, its gender-based classification
cannot be proved to be substantially related to the governmental
objective.

I am certainly not here to say that women should not have
equal job opportunities, equal rights in pay. I agree with all of
that. But on the basis of equity to say that we are involuntarily
someday in the future possibly going to take them out of their
homes, I cannot even conceive of that in the tradition of the
American family and what it has meant to society.
. . . I am not about to vote for one more strike against the
American family and the traditionalism we have known in this
country.
How ridiculous can we get when we cannot recognize anymore
in the popular fad of the time, that we are going to try to have
unisex and make everybody equal, that we cannot recognize that
there are basic fundamental physical and biological differences between men and w9men?
126 CONGo REC. 86539-40 (daily ed. June 10, 1980) (remarks of Sen. Garn). In the same
debate, 8enator Mark Hatfield offered a reasoned counter-voice:
Once the combat issue is put in proper perspective and
the evidence of women's recognized ability to perform military
functions is asseSBed, it becomes apparent that an exclusion of
women from a draft registration requirement would be the
product of the archaic notion that women must remain "as the
center of home and family." One court apparently recognized
as much about the Congress which enacted the prior draft law.
In upholding that law's exclusion of women, the court stated:
"In providing for involuntary service for men and voluntary
service for women, Congress followed the teachings of history
that if a nation is to survive, men must provide the first line of
defense while women keep the home fires burning."
At one time judicially accepted, such romantically pater·
nalistic underpinnings of sex-based classifications are intolerable under current equal protection doctrine. Overbroad generalizations concerning one sex or the other no longer can (sic]
used to substitute for a functional, gender-neutral means of
distinguishing between the physically unfit and the able bodied. The paternalistic attitude inherent in exclusion of women
from past draft registration requirements not only relieved
women of the burden of military service, it also deprived them
of one of the hallmarks of citizenship. Until women and men
share both the rights and the obligations of citizenship, they
will not be equal.
Id. at 86548. (remarks of 8en. Hatfield).
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V. CONCLUSION
Early in the Burger era the Court tried to find a new equal
protection footing, somewhere between the permissiveness of rational basis and the rigidity of strict scrutiny. What resulted was
a fragmentary body of law, sometimes born of poorly elaborated
rationale, sometimes expediently chosen. 148 The questions which
remain after Goldberg reveal how insubstantial the Court's progress and independence have been.
It would go too far, perhaps, to assert that this opinion reflects an alarming shift by the Court. More likely the Court, particularly viewing such regressive legislative trends as the ERA
backlash currently underway, presumed that a decision which
would incorporate women in a registration system would wreak
social havoc. This fear is borne out neither by the popular polls
taken regarding the ERA (in which a clear majority of Americans favored its passage),147 nor in a recent poll conducted by a
national periodical which shows that a majority of the magazine's female readers favor not only military registration but the
elimination of the combat exclusion as well. H8 What the maledominated Congress and male-dominated Supreme Court more
probably reflect is the tired delusion that the military-and war
itself-is a preeminently male world.
The trenches, combat service in the air, transport
jobs in advanced positions, and even the other
less brilliant arenas of activity on the theatre of
146. See Gunther, supra note 87, at 19.
147. A Gallup poll of September 1980 showed 64% of Americans favored the ERA;

Time Magazine's June 1981 poll reported the ERA was (avored 2-1; and an NBC Associated Press poll in July 1981 showed 71 % favored the amendment. ERA COUNTDOWN
CAMPAIGN KIT: STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ERA (1981).
148. (1) Do you think there should be more servicewomen?-Yes: 78%;
No: 22%.
(3) Do you think women should be restricted to noncombat
duties as currently prescribed by law and military policy?-Yes:
40%; No: 60%.
(6) Do you think the military is a good career (or a woman?-Yes: 72%; No: 28%.
(7) Should women be drafted in times of crises?-Yes: 68%;
No: 32%.
This is What You Thought About . .. Women's Role in the Military, GLAMOUR, March
1982, at 33.
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war, are the last remaining strongholds of men. I
suspect that men might rather vacate the arena
altogether than share it with women. Drafting women for the real work of war-not for the pretty,
sideline jobs where you can wear giddy uniforms
and not get dirtied up-would make war much
less inviting to the males. Of course, once we got a
serious discussion of such a draft, we should hear
Chivalry crying out that females are much too
frail to be subjected to the inhuman cruelties and
hardships of what is, after all, "a man's game."
Nonsense! Such a concept of Chivalry is hypocritical. Already it has blankly averted the men's gaze
from the women who do so much of the world's
dirty work-as often as not in the face of discrimination against their seX. 141

Sara MacDwyer

149. Amelia Earhart, quoted in
See generally P. BRIAND, DAUGHTER

WOMEN, WAR, AND EqUALITY,
0' THE SKY

supra note 2, at 269.

(1960).
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